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Comments
Comparable Worth and Title
VII: The Case Against
Disparate Impact Analysis
Comparable worth is said to be the women's issue of the 1980s.'
Labor unions have gone on strike over comparable worth and legisla-
tion has been initiated or enacted to implement comparable worth
in twenty-one states.2 In California, comparable worth legislation has
been enacted3 and a Governor's Task Force on Comparable Worth
was formed in April 1984.1 In addition, the state of California is
a defendant in the latest in a series of comparable worth lawsuits.'
In the most noteworthy case,6 a federal district court in Washington
awarded the plaintiffs a backpay judgment against the state that may
amount to $800 million.7
This author will examine the theory of comparable worth8 and
demonstrate how this concept depends on the ability of an individual
to evaluate and compare jobs.' This author then will discuss the various
legal theories under which comparable worth litigation can proceed.'"
Since reliance on discriminatory effect alone works an unfair result,
this author will conclude that the only permissible theory is one that
1. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAiRs, Tim COMPARABLE WORTH IssuE 1 (1981).
2. Studies have been completed or are under way in the following states: Connecticut,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Equal Employment Advisory Council Meeting, June 29, 1984, San
Francisco, California.
3. 1981 Cal. Stat. c. 722, §2, at 2826 (enacting CAL. GOV'T CODE §19827.2); 1983 Cal.
Stat. c. 906, §1, at 105 (enacting CAL. GOV'T CODE §53248).
4. L. A. DAILY J., April 30, 1984, at 16, col. 3.
5. California State Employees Association v. California, No. C84-7275 MPH (N.D. Cal.,
filed November 21, 1984); American Nurses Association v. State of Illinois, No. 84-64451 (N.D.
Ill., filed May 25, 1984); Penk v. Oregon State Board of Higher Education, No. 80436FR
(D.C. Ore., filed 1980).
6. AFSCME v. State of Washington, 578 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Wash. 1983).
7. L. A. DAiLY J., December 5, 1983, at 5, col. 3.
8. See infra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 114-45 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 43-145 and accompanying text.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
involves proof of discriminatory intent." In the following section,
the theory behind comparable worth will be discussed.
TiE COMPARABLE WORTH THEORY
The doctrine of comparable worth represents an attempt to remedy
the effects of discrimination against women in the United States. Pro-
ponents of this idea note the long history of social and legal discrimina-
tion against women' 2 and claim these "forces" relegate women to
a limited number of jobs in the economy.' 3 In support of their claim,
these proponents cite statistics indicating that seventy percent of the
men and fifty-four percent of the women in the labor force are con-
centrated in occupations dominated by their own sex.' 4 Moreover,
they contend that the same forces that determine the occupation of
a woman operate to keep her wages lower than those of a man."
Advocates of comparable worth cite figures showing that the average
woman is paid sixty-four percent of the wages of the average man.'
The primary tenet of the comparable worth doctrine is that
individuals should be paid according to the worth of the duties per-
formed to their employers.' 7 In this way, salaries are set objectively,
free from subjective sexist influences. 8 Accordingly, comparable worth
theorists assert that implementing this doctrine will reduce pay
disparities between men and women.' 9
Sex discrimination is found under the comparable worth theory when
female workers are paid less than male workers performing jobs of
a similar value to their employers.2" The doctrine, therefore, places
a premium on the ability to measure the worth of an occupation. 2'
Proponents of comparable worth assume that job evaluation studies
constitute an accurate measure of the worth of a job. 2
11. See infra notes 166-86 and accompanying text.
12. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397, 401 (1979).
13. Id.
14. D. TRnAArxN & H. HARTMANN, WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES 28 (1981).
15. Blumrosen, supra note 12, at 401.
16. CImSTI.N SCIENCE MolroR, November 7, 1984, at 19, col. 1.
17. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166.(1981).
18. Blumrosen, supra note 12, at 428.
19. Id.
20. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 1.
21. Id.
22. D. TRE~mN & H. HARTMANN, supra note 14, at 69-70.
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A. The Concept Behind Job Evaluation Studies
While differing in details of design, all job evaluation studies first
describe a position in terms of the various functions involved.23 The
descriptions then are rated according to the relevant compensable
factors.2" These compensable factors are usually the "universal
criteria ' 2 of knowledge, skill, conceptual effort, responsibility, and
working conditions. 26 The ratings are combined to create a total score
and the scores are used to assign wages to job classes." A study utiliz-
ing these methods played a key role in imposing liability on the state
of Washington in AFSCME v. State of Washington, the seminal com-
parable worth suit. 28
TBE ROLE PLAYED BY JOB EVALUATION STUDIS
IN AFSCME v. State of Washington
On November 20, 1973, then Governor Daniel Evans of the state
of Washington received a letter from Norm Schut, Executive Direc-
tor of the Washington Federation of State Employees, accusing the
state of discrimination against women in setting salaries.2" The Gover-
nor responded on November 28, 1973, with a letter to the directors
of the two civil service systems in Washington, the Department of
Personnel and the Higher Education Personnel Board. The letter stated
that an effort must be made to eliminate any and all bias in wages
paid to women.3" The state then contracted for an independent com-
prehensive study to evaluate reports of pay inequities. 3
The state hired the firm of Norman Willis & Associates (hereinafter
Willis), a consulting firm, to conduct the comprehensive study. Willis
evaluated jobs in both state civil service systems in terms of
"knowledge and skills," "mental demands," "accountability," and
"working conditions. ' 32 Released in September, 1974, the Willis Study
found, on the average, a twenty percent disparity33 between the salaries
23. Id. at 71.
24. Id.
25. Blumrosen, supra note 12, at 432.
26. BUREAU oF NATIONAL AIFAIRS, supra note 1, at 45.
27. D. TREBIAN & H. HARTMANN, supra note 14, at 71.
28. AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Wash. 1983).
29. Id. at 860.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 861.
32. Id. at 865 n.9.
33. Id. at 861.
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of jobs predominantly occupied by men and those predominantly
occupied by women.3"
Willis was retained in 1976 to update the 1974 study and to develop
a program leading to the implementation of comparable worth." The
1976 study concluded that the wages of employees in predominantly
female jobs should be raised to the comparable worth salary line
established by the study.36 Governor Evans responded by including
a seven million dollar appropriation in the 1976-77 state budget to
begin the implementation of comparable worth.17 His successor in
office, however, removed this appropriation.38
The American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
(hereinafter AFSCME) brought suit against the state in 1982, on behalf
of the class of employees situated in jobs predominantly occupied
by women.3 9 In this suit, plaintiffs alleged violations of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 196440 (hereinafter Title VII), claiming that
the state had discriminated against the plaintiff class with respect to
compensation. 1 Plaintiffs relied on a disparate impact as well as a
disparate treatment theory.42
The court found for the plaintiffs under both theories, 43 holding
that the 1974 study established sex based differences sufficient to sup-
port a prima facie showing of discrimination under a disparate impact
theory." The court also held that the maintenance of established pay
practices after the 1974 study disclosed pay disparities constituted a
prima facie showing of disparate treatment.s When the state failed
to rebut either showing,46 judgment was entered accordingly.
34. "Predominantly" was defined as 70% one sex or the other. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. The comparable worth salary line was established by plotting job .content against
monthly wages for both male and female jobs and then performing a linear regression analysis
on the data. N. WILLIS & ASSOCIATES, STATE OF WASHINGTON COMPARABLE WORTH STUDY PHASE
11 13 (1976). The irony of this process is that a linear regression analysis is designed to find
the average value of salary for each value of job content. A. AGaasn AND B. AoRIEs, STATISTICAL
METHODs FOR THE SOCIAL ScmNcEs, 280-81 (1979). Instead of raising women's wages to a value
equal to men's wages, the study proposed to raise them only to this average value. Thus, the
pay disparity only would have been reduced, not eliminated.
37. AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. at 851.
38. Id. This appropriation was removed despite the fact that the 1976-77 state budget con-
tained a surplus. Id.
39. Id. at 851.
40. 42 U.S.C. §2000e.
41. AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. at 851.
42. Id. at 864. See infra notes 74-104 and accompanying text (discussion of disparate impact
and disparate treatment).
43. AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. at 864-65.
44. Id. at 863.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 864.
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AFSCME illustrates the role job evaluation studies can play in com-
parable worth litigation. AFSCME also demonstrates how these studies
can constitute one of the elements of proof required in comparable
worth litigation. The large backpay judgment against the state indicates
the necessity of understanding the legal background of a comparable
worth case.
COMPARABLE WORTH LITIGATION
Prior to the 1981 United States Supreme Court decision in County
of Washington v. Gunther,47 wage discrimination suits could be brought
only under the terms of the Equal Pay Act. 8 This act limits claims
to situations in which a female performs a job substantially equal
to that performed by a male but is paid less.49 This limitation was
due to a broad interpretation of the Bennett Amendment 5° to Title
VII, by several lower federal courts that held the entire Equal Pay
Act was incorporated into Title VII.5 '
In Lemons v. City and County of Denver,52 for example, nurses
employed by the defendant brought an action under Title VII. The
nurses alleged that they were underpaid relative to other city positions
of "an equal worth." 3 The court rejected this claim and held that
the "Bennett Amendment is generally considered to have the equal
pay/equal work concept apply to Title VII in the same way it applies
in the Equal Pay Act." ' 54 Since the positions of the plaintiffs were
not substantially similar to the positions offered in comparison, the
Equal Pay Act did not apply." This narrow approach to wage
discrimination suits remained intact until 1981.
A. Expansion Of Wage Discrimination Litigation: County of
Washington v. Gunther
The United States Supreme Court viewed the Bennett Amendment
differently in County of Washington v. Gunther." This case involved
the claims of four female prison guards who alleged that they were
47. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
48. 29 U.S.C. §206(d).
49. Hodgson v. Behren's Drug Co., 475 F.2d 1041, 1049 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 822 (1973).
50. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(h).
51. Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980); Christensen
v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1978).
52. 620 F.2d 228, 229 (10th Cir. 1980).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 229-30.
55. Id. at 230.
56. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
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paid less than male guards." Since male guards were responsible for
more than ten times as many prisoners than were female guards, the
Court held that the two positions were not substantially similar so
that the Equal Pay Act did not apply. 8 The defendant employer had
set the plaintiffs' wages lower than its own job study indicated they
should be paid while paying the male guards at the level recommended
by the study.5 9 Plaintiffs alleged that this failure to utilize the same
practices used to pay men constituted intentional discrimination for-
bidden by Title VII. 6°
By a five to four vote, the Court interpreted the Bennett Amend-
ment as incorporating only the four Equal Pay Act defenses6 into
Title VI162 and rejected the contention that the entire Equal Pay Act
was included in Title VII. 63 The Court thus allowed the plaintiffs to
allege sex based wage discrimination since the jobs compared were
not substantially similar. 64 The Court held that the language of the
Bennett Amendment suggested that the Equal Pay Act defenses were
incorporated into Title VII. 61 The majority supported this interpreta-
tion with evidence of the Congressional intent in enacting the Bennett
Amendment, 6 citing floor discussions during the debate over the merits
of Title VII6 revealing that the intent behind the Bennett Amend-
ment was to relate the Equal Pay Act to Title VII, not to resolve
any conflict between the two statutes." From this perception of a
lack of conflict between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, the majority
reasoned that Congress could not have intended to incorporate the
entire Equal Pay Act into Title VII.69 By concentrating on the intent
behind the 1964 passage of the Bennett Amendment, the majority
apparently ignored the Congressional rejection of a comparable worth
standard during the passage of the Equal Pay Act.7" The dissenting
57. Id. at 164.
58. Id. at 165.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 164.
61. 29 U.S.C. §206(d). The Equal Pay Act defenses are a seniority system, a merit system,
quality or quantity of production, or any factor other than sex.
62. 452 U.S. at 171.
63. Id. at 168.
64. Id. at 181 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 168.
66. Id. at 171-76.
67. Id. at 173-76. See 110 Cong. Rec. 13647 (1964).
68. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 174.
69. Id. at 174-75.
70. Id. at 184-88 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1985 / Comparable Worth Litigation
justices, conversely, based their arguments upon that demonstration
of congressional intent.7'
The Gunther holding thus authorizes suits comparing jobs to be
brought under Title VII. 72 This result is most advantageous to a com-
parable worth plaintiff, since the jobs being compared need not be
substantially similar as required by the Equal Pay Act. Instead, the
broad prohibitions of Title VII forbidding an employer "to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual' 73 with respect to compensation
because of an individual's sex now apply. Since a Title VII cause
of action now may be alleged, comparable worth plaintiffs also may
utilize the Title VII theories of litigation.
B. Theories of Litigation Under Title VII
Currently, cases arising under Title VII may be brought utilizing
either a disparate treatment or a disparate impact theory.74 Under the
disparate treatment theory, an employer violates Title VII by inten-
tionally treating some people less favorably than others because of
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." This theory attempts
to alleviate the "crass aspect ' 76 of discrimination. Under the disparate
impact theory, an employer violates Title VII by utilizing facially
neutral practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in operation.7
This approach is designed to eliminate subtle forms of discrimination.78
An employer may be found liable under both theories in the same
lawsuit. 9
Two fundamental differences exist between these approaches. One
difference is that a plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent in a
disparate treatment claim but not in a disparate impact claim.80 The
other difference is that an employer can defend a disparate treatment
claim by showing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
apparent inequality." In a disparate impact claim, an employer can
71. Id.
72. Id. at 181.
73. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (emphasis added).
74. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
75. Id.
76. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1271 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The "crass aspect" covers
the obvious situations, for example, when an employer pays a white employee more than a
black employee who does the same work.
77. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
78. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1271 n.18.
79. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
80. Id.
81. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
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defend by showing that a business necessity justifies the challenged
practice. 2
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green83 provides a classic example of
how the disparate treatment theory operates. The plaintiff, a black
civil rights activist, applied for a position with the defendant
corporation. 4 Although qualified for the position, the application of
the plaintiff was denied while the defendant continued to accept other
applications for the job.85 An inference could be drawn that plaintiff
was not hired because of race in violation of Title VII. Due to the
fact that the plaintiff had instigated a demonstration against the defen-
dant that resulted in pecuniary loss to the corporation,8 6 a legitimate
reason not based on race existed for not hiring the plaintiff.87
Therefore, the defendant incurred no liability.
An example of the disparate impact theory is provided by Griggs
v. Duke Power Co.88 The defendant company instituted guidelines
requiring employees to possess a high school education and pass two
aptitude tests.89 These requirements disqualified more blacks than
whites from employment." Clearly, the use of educational standards
did not involve discriminatory intent.9' Just as clearly, however, the
use of these criteria impacted more heavily on blacks than whites.
The defendant, therefore, was required to show how the challenged
practice related to job performance. 2 Since the record revealed that
those hired before the guidelines went into effect without an educa-
tion or high test scores performed as well as those without these
credentials, 93 the Court held that the use of the aptitude tests were
not needed to achieve the defendant's aim of a high quality
workforce.94
The disparate impact and disparate treatment theories merge in cases
referred to as "pattern or practice" cases. 95 Plaintiffs in these cases
allege employer discrimination against a class of persons rather than
82. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
83. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
84. Id. at 796.
85. Id. at 796, 802.
86. Id. at 796.
87. Id. at 803.
88. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
89. Id. at 427-28.
90. Id. at 426.
91. Id. at 432.
92. Id. at 431.
93. Id. at 431-32.
94. Id.
95. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1267.
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against an individual.9 6 The class claims that an employer has utilized
facially neutral practices that are expected to result in discrimination.97
Intent is inferred from the conscious maintenance of the discriminatory
practice.98 Since this claim involves the actual practices used, a disparate
impact claim also is made. 99 Thus, a single fact pattern may involve
both theories.' AFSCME v. State of Washington provides a good
example of this merger.101
By nature, comparable worth cases are "pattern or practice" cases.
Due to the fact that occupants of predominantly female jobs seek
to compare their positions with male jobs, class-wide discrimination
is involved. The allegations involve both the practices used and the
reason for their use. A comparable worth class action theoretically
then can proceed under both disparate treatment and disparate impact
theories.
The disparate impact theory developed in hiring discrimination cases
brought under 42 United States Code section 2000e-2(a)(2).' °2 This
statute prohibits practices that classify employees and adversely affect
employment opportunities. Comparable worth cases, in contrast, in-
volve allegations of discrimination with respect to wages, which arise
under 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-2(a)(1). The United States Supreme
Court has not stated explicitly that only a disparate treatment analysis
should be applied in wage discrimination cases."0 3 The Court recently
denied certiorari to a wage discrimination case applying a disparate
impact analysis."' The effect of shifting the burden of production
under a disparate impact analysis reveals the reason why only a
disparate treatment analysis should be applied in comparable worth
litigation.
C. Order of Proof in Title VII Cases
The order of proof is similar for both disparate impact and disparate
96. Id. at 1266.
97. Id.; see Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360 n.46.
98. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1266; see Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,
458 (1979).
99. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1266.
100. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
101. In AFSCME, the court found that the pay practices of the State had a disparate impact
on women inasmuch as women were paid less on the average than men. 578 F. Supp. at 863.
The court also found that the State was guilty under a disparate treatment theory because
the State maintained its pay practices after learning of the pay disparities. Id.
102. Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492, 1494 (9th Cir. 1983).
103. Id.; see City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 711 n.20 (1978).
104. Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 52
U.S.L.W. 3906 (1984).
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treatment cases.'0 5 A prima facie case must be established by the plain-
tiff to satisfy the plaintiff's initial burden of production and shift
the burden of production to the defendant." 6 A defendant may rebut
the prima facie showing by demonstrating a legitimate reason for the
alleged disparate treatment'07 or a business necessity for the disparate
impact.'0 8 Once the defendant raises a genuine issue of fact as to
whether the defendant has discriminated against the plaintiff, the defen-
dant rebuts the prima facie case.' 0 9 The burden of persuasion then
rests with the defendant. In a disparate treatment case, the plaintiff
then must show that the rebuttal put forth by the defendant is a mere
pretext for intentional discrimination. ' 0 In a disparate impact case,
the plaintiff must show that other policies would serve an employer
equally well.I
The prima facie showing for both theories of recovery necessitates
proof that "raises an inference of discrimination.'"" 2 In a disparate
treatment case, a prima facie showing is made with proof that a plain-
tiff is treated differently because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."I3 A showing that a practice creates a disparity adverse
to a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case in a disparate impact
claim. 114
Statistics can play a very important role in establishing a prima
facie case.' Discriminatory intent for a disparate treatment claim
may be inferred from statistics constituting a "sufficient showing of
disparity.""116 An entire prima facie case of disparate impact can be
established with a statistical showing that one class is treated differently
than another." 7 Of course, a prima facie case must be established
by a preponderance of the evidence" 8 and a defendant can always
impeach the credibility of the statistical evidence by demonstrating
methodological errors." 9
105. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1267 n.12.
106. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
107. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
108. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
109. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
110. Id. at 255-56.
111. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 426.
112. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
113. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802.
114. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425.
115. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1267.
116. Id.
117. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979).
118. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
119. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1268.
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JOB EVALUATION STUDIES
After a job evaluation study measures the job content of various
positions, those positions predominantly held by men are compared
with those positions predominantly held by women.' 20 If the female
positions are paid less, a prima facie case of discrimination with respect
to wages has been presented. The burden of production consequently
will shift to the defendant. Since job evaluation studies can shift the
burden of production and possibly impose liability on a defendant,
these studies need to be examined closely.
A. The Methodology of Job Evaluation Studies
Job evaluation studies have been criticized heavily by experts because
the methodology involves extensive subjective judgment.' 2' The follow-
ing section will demonstrate how subjective judgment can enter into
a study. The study utilized in AFSCME will be used to show where
subjectivity can be found.
Not all jobs in a firm are examined in the course of a job evalua-
tion study.2 2 Instead, a representative cross-section of jobs are selected.
These jobs are known as "benchmark" jobs.' 23 The choice of bench-
mark jobs is crucial.'24 If only the relatively higher paying male jobs
and the lower paying female jobs are selected, the study will show
sex based pay differences even though these differences actually may
not occur.'25 A scientific method of selecting the benchmark posi-
tions is critical to the reliability of the study.
The study in AFSCME evaluated only 121 of over 3,000 job
classifications.' 26 Moreover, no mention was made regarding how the
121 classifications were chosen. 27 Additionally, the study did not
disclose whether the consultants or the State Advisory Committee
selected the jobs. The possibility of manipulation, however subtle,
was present.
The next step in the evaluation process was to break down each
position into the particular functions necessary to perform the job. 2 '
120. Grune & Reder, Pay Equity: An Innovative Public Policy Approach to Eliminating
Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, 12 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 395, 397 (1983).
121. Blumrosen, supra note 12, at 428-41.
122. D. TiM tis & H. HARTMANN, supra note 14, at 76.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. N. WILLIS & ASSOCIATES, STATE OF WASHINGTON COMPARABLE WORTH STUDY 2 (Sept.
1974) [hereinafter cited as WILLIS].
127. Id.
128. Blumrosen, supra note 12, at 431.
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Obviously, the judgment of those describing the jobs will greatly
influence the results. ' 29 The consultants in Washington attempted to
gather data by sending questionnaires to 1,600 employees chosen at
random from the 13,612 employees in the designated job
classifications.' 30 Of the 1,600, approximately 800 employees were
interviewed by the consultants and task force members.' 3 ' Additionally,
the consultants added information to the questionnaires based on their
observations of the selected employees.' 3 2 Thus, the following two
levels of subjective opinion were at work: (1) the views of the
employees, and (2) the views of the consultants.
The answers then were screened by the consultants.'33 The consultants
selected those answers that they felt "described positions most represen-
tative of [the] respective classifications."" 4 The consultants screened
responses based on their opinion that some were more complete and
of a higher quality than others. ' 35 No criteria were given as to what
constituted a representative, complete or quality answer. Clearly, these
choices were made solely on the opinion of the consultants involved.
In general, after job descriptions are complete, each classification
is assigned a value based on how the components of the job corres-
pond to the given compensable factors." 36 Most experts believe that
the following three universal compensable factors exist: (1) knowledge;
(2) mental and physical demands; and (3) responsibility.' These fac-
tors, however, must be subdivided into specific characteristics that
make up "knowledge," "mental demands," and "responsibility."" ' 8
The subdivision process particularly is susceptible to influences that
can take the form of sexual bias. Critics of job studies claim that
this choice may ignore the skills involved in typically women's work," 9
but a study designed to find sex discrimination easily could over-
emphasize these same skills. If physical demands are calculated, for
instance, the manual dexterity involved in secretarial work may be
overmephasized or underemphasized relative to the heavy lifting in
construction.'40 After the compensable factors are broken down, each
129. D. TREIMAN & H. HARTMANN, supra note 14, at 72.
130. WILLIs, supra note 126, at 3-4.
131. Id. at 4.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 5.
136. D. TRE AN & H. HARThAN, supra note 14, at 72.
137. Blumrosen, supra note 12, at 432.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 436.
140. Id. at 437.
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component then must be weighted.' 41 Again, critics claim that sexism
may cause physical demands and working conditions to be weighted
heavier than skill and responsibility,'4 2 but bias also can work in favor
of women. In any event, the outcome of a study will depend heavily
on how the examiner values one compensable factor relative to
another. 143
The AFSCME study employed the following four compensable fac-
tors: (1) knowledge and skill; (2) mental demands; (3) accountability;
and (4) working conditions.'4 4 The four factors were subdivided into
very broad characteristics. For example, the category "knowledge and
skill" was divided into "job knowledge" and "interpersonal skills."' 45
"Job knowledge" was defined as the "occupational, specialized or
functional knowledge or skill required by an incumbent.'" Interper-
sonal skills were defined as "the extent to which the position is required
to serve, influence and/or motivate others."'' 4 7 These general categories
obviously were used in order to minimize charges of sexual bias. Both
manual dexterity and heavy lifting are covered by this expansive defini-
tion. Working conditions are deemed to include discomfort, both
physical and psychological. ' 4" Thus, both the auto mechanic and the
executive secretary are covered by these definitions. The use of general
categories, however, places additional emphasis on the subjective judg-
ment of those evaluating the positions.
The AFSCME study did not mention how the different categories
were weighted. All that was revealed were the number of points
assigned to each category and a total number of points awarded to
each job.'49 This report does nothing to dispel inferences of subjec-
tive bias.
Due to the fact that the methodology of job evaluation studies lacks
a detailed technique of evaluating the benchmark jobs, the reliability
of the study depends on the expertise of those who conduct the study.
In the AFSCME study, a committee trained by the consultants actually
evaluated the worth of the benchmark jobs.'50 The backgrounds of
the committee members revealed no special qualifications in the job
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. D. TREmAN & H. HARTMANN, supra note 14, at 75.
144. WILLIs, supra note 126, at 5-6.
145. Id. at 5.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 6.
149. Id. at 8 and Table of Evaluations, following 8.
150. Id. at 7.
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evaluation area. A registered nurse supervisor, a social worker, the
registrar from a state college, an economist from the Department of
Highways, a labor representative, and the director of the State
Women's Council constituted half the committee membership.'' Not
only was the committee inexperienced, but all evaluations were arrived
at by group consensus.' 52 Compromise among members necessary to
reach a consensus merely operates to increase the effects of subjectivity.
After each job was assigned a value in the AFSCME study, the
salaries of predominantly male and female jobs of equal value were
compared. The study revealed that those in predominantly female jobs
were paid only eighty percent of the wages of those in predominantly
male jobs.'53 This finding is suspect because of the subjective influence
present in the study and the lack of qualifications of those who actually
performed this analysis. Allowing subjective studies to shift the Title
VII evidentiary burden clearly is unfair.
B. Job Evaluation Studies in a Disparate Impact Analysis
While the foregoing discussion points out the particular
methodological shortcomings of the AFSCME study, job evaluation
studies in general are inherently subjective in nature and dependent
on the opinions of those who participate in the effort." 4 As statistical
evidence, job evaluation studies can constitute by themselves a prima
facie case of sex based wage discrimination.'" If methodological errors
are obvious, a defendant may impeach the credibility of a study in
order to prevent a prima facie case from arising by a preponderance
of the evidence.' 56 If subjective opinion is only subtly present, the
plaintiff may succeed in this phase of the case.' 7 The defendant then
must prove that an overriding business consideration justifies the pay
practice.' 5 ' The court will balance these considerations against the
countervailing national interest in eliminating employment
discrimination.' 5 9 This is an extremely high threshold to clear.
Considering the consequences of a shift of the burden of produc-
tion under a disparate impact theory in a comparable worth case,
151. Id. The other half of the committee worked in the personnel field and were presumably
more experienced. Id.
152. Id. at 8.
153. Id. at 13.
154. D. TREIMAN & H. HARTMANN, supra note 14, at 94; Hildebrand, The Market System,
in CoMpARABtE WORTH: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 83 (E. Livernash, ed. 1980).
155. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 584.
156. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1268.
157. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587.
158. Bonilla, 697 F.2d at 1303.
159. Id.
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this result becomes all the more unfair. An employer then must show
that the wage structure is justified by business necessity. 6 ' Evidence
of the profit margin of the employer, though, may show that higher
wages could have been paid to those in predominantly female jobs
without interrupting the "efficient operation of the business."' 6' Other
factors also may enter into the wage calculations of a defendant, such
as labor-management relations'"2 or the individual choice of an
employee.' 63 If the truck drivers union is stronger than the clerical
union, the employer will be forced to pay truck drivers more than the
clerical workers. This will result, however, in the creation of a sex
based wage disparity between the two groups. The employer then faces
either a strike by the truck drivers or a Title VII action brought by
the clerical workers. If a collective bargaining situation is not in effect,
an employer will negotiate individually with employees. A woman may
agree to work for less money than a man. This creates another sex
based wage disparity and a disparate impact will punish an employer
for the actions of an employee. These factors that often determine
wage levels demonstrate the difficulty of showing a business necessity
to rebut the prima facie case of the plaintiff. 6"
C. Admissibility of Job Evaluation Studies
Courts could take two approaches in addressing the issue of the
admissibility of job evaluation studies. A court could refuse to admit
job evaluation studies because the studies fail the test for admissibility
of scientific evidence' 65 articulated in Frye v. United States:
66
while [the] courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which this deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs. 67
Admissibility thus depends on how well the experts in a field have
received a new technique. The subjectivity and unreliability of job
160. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
161. Peters v. Lieuallen, 693 F.2d 966, 969 (9th Cir. 1982).
162. See Note, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Under the Title VII Disparate Impact Doc-
trine, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1083, 1098 (1982).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Scientific evidence can either make data available by scientific means or evaluate data
by scientific means. Giannelli, Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Fry v. United States
A Half-Century Later, 80 COL. L. Rav. 1197, 1200-01 n.19 (1980). By weighting data pertain-
ing to job function, job evaluation studies fit into the latter category.
166. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
167. Id. at 1014.
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studies noted above have been criticized soundly by experts in the
comparable worth field. 68 Thus, job evaluation studies would not
be admitted under the Frye test.
Not all courts follow the Frye test, 6 ' however, and many courts
follow the "relevancy approach"' 7 o of Professor McCormick."' Pro-
fessor McCormick proposes to admit scientific evidence if supported
by a qualified expert,'12 letting disagreements in the scientific com-
munity over reliability bear on the weight of the evidence.' 73 The
availability of expert testimony poses no problem for the comparable
worth plaintiff, for the author of the study certainly would testify
as to the reliability of the study at issue. Hence, the relevancy approach
probably would admit job studies into evidence. This fact points out
the necessity of another solution to the dilemma posed by subjective
job evaluation studies.
ELIMNATING DIsPARATE IMPACT FROM
COMPARABLE WORTH CASES
This author proposes to reject the use of the disparate impact
analysis in comparable worth litigation. The impact of subjective studies
then would be reduced because a plaintiff would have to prove
discriminatory intent to succeed."' Studies still could be utilized by
a plaintiff to demonstrate disparities in pay between the sexes, but
these studies would constitute a prima facie case only if accompanied
by facts that indicate the intentional utilization of illegal practices
by the defendant.' 75
In response to cases suggesting that comparable worth litigation
should be limited to disparate treatment theories, 76 commentators have
argued that disparate treatment analyses are inadequate to eliminate
all discrimination with respect to compensation."' Critics of the
disparate treatment analysis claim that an employer easily can cite
a legitimate reason to justify pay practices with a discriminatory
168. Blumrosen, supra note 12, at 428-41.
169. GIANNELLI, supra note 165, at 1228.
170. Id. at 1232-33.
171. See E. Cleary, ed., McCoRM .CK ON EVIDENCE 608 (3rd ed. 1984).
172. Id. at 606-07.
173. Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 371 (Md. Ct. App. 1978).
174. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15.
175. Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577.
176. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161; Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686 (9th
Cir. 1984).
177. See Comment, Comparable Worth, Disparate Impact and the Market Rate Salary
Problem: A Legal Analysis and Statistical Application, 71 CAL. L. REv. 730, 741 (1983).
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effect. ' Countering this contention is the fact that a plaintiff then
may show that the explanation of the defendant is a mere pretext
for discrimination.
79
Proponents of the disparate impact theory also note that
discriminatory intent is difficult to prove.' 80 Courts, however, have
been relatively eager to infer proof of discriminatory intent.'8 ' Intent
may be inferred from a sufficient showing of a disparity," 2 the con-
scious maintenance of a discriminatory practice,"13 or departures from
usual patterns of decision making." 4 Therefore, comparable worth
cases still could proceed if proof of discriminatory intent is required.
If proof of intent is required, a verdict for a plaintiff is more indicative
of illegal action.
Restricting comparable worth litigation to those cases in which
discriminatory intent can be proven will not impede efforts to cure
pay disparities. Both Gunther and AFSCME stand for the proposi-
tion that the failure to implement job evaluation studies constitutes
intentional discrimination." ' Any disparities disclosed must be cured
in the many studies that have been commissioned in the wake of the
AFSCME decision. Further, a federal court in Pennsylvania has held
that the failure to conduct a study is actionable." 6 Restricting wage
discrimination suits to disparate treatment theories will not eliminate
comparable worth; rather, a plaintiff's efforts will shift towards secur-
ing the commissioning of a study.
Elimination of disparate impact analysis from comparable worth
litigation also eliminates inequities peculiar to "pattern or practice"
cases. After a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate treat-
ment, an employer will often seek to rebut by demonstrating a specific
nondiscriminatory employment practice as the cause of the disparity."'
In so doing, however, a defendant actually articulates a business prac-
tice with an adverse effect on the plaintiff class, establishing a prima
facie case of disparate impact for the plaintiffs."' Rebutting a prima
facie case of disparate treatment in a "pattern or practice" case forces
178. Id.
179. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
180. See Comment, supra note 177, at 741.
181. See infra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
182. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1267.
183. Columbus Board of Education, 443 U.S. at 458.
184. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1977).
185. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 180-81; AFSCME, 578 F. Supp. at 867.
186. See, e.g. Taylor v. Charley Brothers Co., 25 Fair Employment Practices Cases (BNA)
602 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
187. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1270.
188. Id.
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a defendant then to rebut a disparate impact claim that the plaintiffs
never established.'89 The burdens of proof clearly weigh too heavily
upon an employer if disparate impact analyses are allowed.
The reasons for the creation of the disparate impact analysis also
support the limitation of comparable worth litigation to a disparate
treatment approach. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently noted
that the disparate impact model was designed to handle specific
employment requirements which are not job related.' 90 Examples of
this are the aptitude tests of Griggs,'9 ' height and weight
requirements, ' 92 and pregnancy leaves. ,93 The disparate impact model
was not designed for a wide ranging attack on the employment prac-
tices of a company.' 9 This court held that setting wages involves
general policies, not specific practices. 19 Since a comparable worth
suit challenges the wage practices of an employer, a disparate impact
analysis should not be allowed.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of comparable worth represents an attempt to produce
equality in pay between the sexes. The key instrumentality of this
doctrine is the job evaluation study that analyzes the positions of an
employer and compares predominantly female positions with
predominantly male positions. Since comparable worth cases may be
litigated under Title VII, job studies can play a crucial role in relegating
the burdens of proof among the parties. Due to the inherent
methodological weaknesses of job studies, these studies alone should
not be able to shift the burden of production to the defendant.
Discriminatory intent also should be proven before requiring a defen-
dant to justify the pay practices at issue.
Much has been written about the broad remedial purposes of Title
VII' 96 and about the importance of providing a remedy to plaintiffs
affected by discrimination.' 97 The courts should be careful to avoid
favoring a plaintiff over a defendant.' 98 Allowing a plaintiff to pre-
sent suspect statistical evidence in order to establish a prima facie
189. Id.
190. Spaulding, 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984).
191. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
192. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
193. Harris v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980).
194. Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 706.
195. Id. at 707.
196. See, e.g., Gunther, 452 U.S. at 178-80.
197. Id.; see also Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976);
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 702.
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case is tantamount to placing the burden of proof on a defendant
from the start. The difficulties of establishing a business necessity
defense in a comparable worth case and the merger of disparate im-
pact and treatment analyses in "pattern or practice" cases show how
disparate impact theories unfairly operate against a comparable worth
defendant.
Even if plaintiffs are restricted to a disparate treatment theory, defen-
dant employers still may be liable under the doctrine of comparable
worth. Ultimately, the fate of an employer still rests on the results
of a job evaluation study. The employer can only hope that the results
are not too badly skewed by subjective input.
Robert Lawrence Bragg
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